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Introduction
In this paper, we estimate pass-through rates of import price changes to retail prices across retailers and consumers for apparel purchases in There is a substantial literature on pass-through rates, mostly on the pass-through of exchange rate changes, see e.g. Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for an excellent survey. 1 Typically, these studies document incomplete pass-through rates, i.e. goods prices change by less than real exchange rates. Important factors in explaining incomplete pass-through rates include (but are not limited to) search frictions (Alessandria, 2004 Corsetti and Dedola (2005) . Among the papers most closely related to ours are Nakamura and Zerom (2010), and Hellerstein (2008) who emphasize the importance of markup adjustment and local cost. Nakamura and Zerom 1 In this paper, we do not explicitly look at exchange rate pass-through. Exchange rate variation, however, is one of the sources of import price variation we see in the data. We cannot distinguish between di¤erent reasons of price variation. Accordingly, the obtained results on pass-through rates of import price changes cannot be compared directly to pass-through rates of exchange rate changes. However, we show that distribution cost and the degree of competition that explain incomplete exchange rate pass-through also explain incomplete import price pass-through.
(2010) estimate an incomplete pass-through to retail prices in the US co¤ee industry of 27%. They show that local costs account for 59% of incomplete pass-through. Hellerstein (2008) , who investigates US beer prices, …nds that retailer markup adjustments and local-cost components explain incomplete pass-through.
The two main contributions of this paper are as follows: First, we show that the pass-through of import price changes to retail prices is incomplete and di¤ers across …rms. We estimate that high price-retailers do not pass through changes in the import price. By contrast, low price-retailers show a pass-through rate of 53% within three months. Our paper builds upon the importance of local cost and the degree of competition as explanations for incomplete pass-through (see e.g. Nakamura & Zerom, 2010 and Hellerstein, 2008) . We explain the degree of pass-through and the asymmetry in pass-through rates in a simple model with vertical product di¤erentiation, where one …rm bundles an ex-ante homogeneous good with a service. O¤ering the services is costly for …rms and induces di¤erent price elasticities of demand, di¤erent markups and thus di¤erent exposure of …rms to competition. Second, we show that pass-through rates also di¤er across income groups. The estimated pass-through rate of 58% for low-income households is signi…cantly larger than those for high-income households. Low-income households prefer retailers with lower price levels that have higher pass-through rates, whereas high-income households buy from retailers with higher price levels that show lower pass-through rates. Consequently, we observe asymmetric real income e¤ects of import price changes across consumers as a result of di¤erent consumption patterns. 2 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and provides stylized facts. In section 3, we present our estimation strategy and the empirical results. Section 4 introduces our theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
Data And Stylized Facts
In this section we describe the data and provide stylized facts that motivate our analysis.
We use the "Universalpanel" -monthly household consumption data provided by the "Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung" (GfK), a German market research institute. The data cover the period from January 2000 to December 2007 and has a total of 2,036,356 observations. This includes 11,934 households and 188 retailers. Participating households have to assign their purchases to 102 di¤erent categories (ranging from apparel products as well as electronic articles to housewares) and specify the price and the retailer for each purchased item. One observation consists of one reported product purchase by one household (k) at a retailer (r) at time (t). Additionally, household characteristics such as the net income and size as well as the buyer's age, profession, and education are reported. In this paper, we focus on the apparel categories only, since these categories exhibit high changes in import prices and a high import penetration. Our …nal sample contains 22 apparel categories. These include all apparel categories as classi…ed by the GfK except two categories of "overcoats", for which data were only available for one year of observations. Overall, the …nal data include 829,320 observations for 11, 613 households and 80 di¤erent retailers. Since apparel products are bought infrequently, we calculate monthly averages to guarantee su¢cient observations. Data on German import unit values for apparel products are provided by Eurostat and cover the same period. 3 Our empirical approach is the following: First, the dependent variable is constructed as the monthly price of a retailer averaged over all household purchases. In a second step, the monthly average price for two household groups with high and low income is calculated for each retailer. We use this average price as dependent variable. Each of these variables is then regressed on changes in the import price in the apparel sector. 3 Speci…cally, we consider all imports from outside the European Union in the combined nomenclature (CN) categories 61 (Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted) and 62 (Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted), which report quantities and volumes. Prices are c.i.f. and in Euro. Accordingly, cost, insurance, and freight are covered, but not tari¤s. Protection in the apparel sector, however, occurred mostly in the form of quotas -elimination of quotas should be directly re ‡ected in import prices. 4 dotted line of imports from countries within the EU ‡uctuates around a relatively stable value of 100 million units per month. By contrast, we observe a steady increase in extra-EU imports following the …nal two steps of the ATC phase-out, even though quotas for Chinese textiles were re-introduced. By far, the majority of apparel imports comes from outside the EU. 4 It is exactly these countries that bene…ted from the ATC phase-out.
Additionally, if we only consider extra-EU trade, the correlation between the seasonally adjusted import unit values and an overall average retail price is high with a value of 0:75 in contrast to a correlation of 0:28 for intra-EU trade. This suggests that imports from outside the EU play an important role for German apparel retailers. In the following, we will thus de…ne import prices as the average unit value of all German extra-EU imports in the CN categories 61 and 62 in a month t. To compute the unit values, we use "supplementary units", which show the quantity traded in terms of pieces. As unit values are an approximation for prices, unit value per piece instead of ton or kilo seems to be a more reasonable approach for this approximation. Accordingly, all observations are provided in the same quantity unit. To compute unit values we aggregate the value of all apparel imports and divide by the number of pieces. In case the supplementary unit is missing, we delete the 8-digit apparel category from the computation of unit values.
This, however, is only the case for less than 13% of all categories, which represent 8.5%
of the total value of apparel imports.
One explanation for incomplete pass-through of import prices into retail prices is local cost components including service costs. Services that some retailers o¤er are re ‡ected in higher prices. 5 To construct a measure of the price level for each retailer, we …rst calculate s rj = p rj =P j over all periods, where p rj is the average price of retailer r in GfK-category j and P j is the average price in GfK-category j over all retailers.
Weighting s rj with the number of sales in a category yields S r = P s rj c j C , where c j is the number of sales in category j and C is the total number of sales for a given retailer.
A value of S r 1 characterizes a retailer who charges prices above average. These retailers are referred to as H-type retailers in the following. S r < 1 implies a lower price level and we will refer to these as L-type retailers. 4 Another implicit observation of Figure 1 is that these imports replaced German domestic production of apparel goods. As found in Braakmann and Wagner (2009) and Ra¤ and Wagner (2010) , German production dropped by about 50% from 2000 to 2006. 5 We are well aware of the fact that other di¤erences across retailers may be included in this measure. Retailers might sell di¤erent products within the same GfK-categories. Retailers with a more e¢cient distributional organization could charge a lower price to customers. The smaller the distance to production facilities, the faster a retailer may be able to react to changes in demand. This might be more important for seasonal clothing and to a lesser extent for basic items such as T-shirts.
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The average prices for H-and L-type retailers reveal substantial di¤erences, as Figure   2 shows. We focus on deviations from the mean of each variable. 6 The dashed line shows that the L-type retailer's average retail price follows very closely the import price, which is represented by the solid line. By contrast, the short-dashed line of H-type average retail prices seem to be much more isolated from the import price. The GfK-data on household purchases provide 16 di¤erent income intervals and the size of the household. In order to calculate the per-capita income, we assume the mean of each interval as the household income and divide it by the scaled number of household members. 7 The lowest quartile of the per-capita income distribution de…nes the low-income group and the highest quartile the high-income group. 7 Household size needs to be scaled in order to adjust for the non-proportinal increase in needs with respect to household members. We use the OECD-modi…ed scale of equivalence which applies a value of 1 for the …rst household member. Each additional person is assigned a value of 0.5 and each child under the age of 14 a value of 0.3. Nevertheless, our results hold qualitatively for di¤erent speci…cations of the equivalence scales as Appendix A.5 shows. For a review on equivalence scales, see for example De Vos and Zaidi (1997) . 8 According to the equivalence scales we use, children are de…ned as aged 14 or younger. 9 The o¢cial GfK data ranks education from 2 "basic schooling without vocational training" in six steps to 9 "university/college degree". 
Empirical Strategy and Results
We interpret changes in the import unit value as a change in import prices and estimate how these changes a¤ect retail prices. Generally, the data have three dimensions: household (k), retailer (r), and time (t). Since we focus on apparel products, which are not purchased as frequently as e.g. food, we do not obtain su¢cient observations for each household at each retailer at each point in time. It is therefore not feasible to consider all dimensions at the same time. The same restriction applies to the GfK product categories. Moreover, our data do not include retailer speci…c information on the origin of imported apparel. 11 Therefore, we need to calculate the average price over all apparel categories. For this to be a valid approach, it is crucial that retailers should have a rather identical product portfolio, but do not specialize in selling only one or a few types of apparel. The data show that indeed all of the retailers are multi-product …rms that sell products in many di¤erent apparel categories. In fact, 61 out of 80 retailers in our data show sales in all 22 apparel categories. The mean number of apparel categories that the 80 retailers sell is 21.42. Accordingly, it seems valid to assume that all retailers have the same type of products in their portfolio. 12 Showing that products within the apparel categories are identical across retailers is more challenging. Our data set does not allow us to distinguish apparel beyond its category (e.g. in terms of quality). Available anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that our assumption is not unreasonable. Evidence from a television report, for instance, shows that jeans production in China is identical for high and low-price jeans. 13 Further evidence comes from other sectors, such as the food sector, where identical items are sold under di¤erent (high and low price) brands.
To exclude the possibility that di¤erences in the country of origin, e.g. di¤erences in currency pass-through, drive the results, we estimate pass-through rates only with the price for Chinese imports as a robustness check. The ranking of the pass-through rates remains identical. 14 The import price is calculated at the 2-digit level in order to match the aggregation level of the household data. Therefore, our empirical approach is the following: First, the dependent variable is constructed as the monthly price of a retailer r averaged over all household purchases (p r t ). Then, the monthly average price of each of the two household groups of high and low income is calculated for each retailer and we use this average price as dependent variable (p h;r t ). Each of these variables is regressed on changes in the import price in the apparel sector (p i t ).
Retailers
We consider a regression equation that is motivated by several other pass-through studies 
where p rstepwise adjustment to cost changes. 15 This yields the following estimation equation:
where the de…nition of the variables is the same as in (1). We add an interaction term of the import unit value and the dummy variable low, which equals 1 if the retailer has a price level lower than 1. That is, the total impact of a change of the import unit value on the average price of an L-type retailer equals P 2 j=0 j + j . The control variables captured by the vector D include the number of households, the retailers' revenue, dummies for retailers and ATC phase-out stages, monthly dummies, and a time trend measure.
We now discuss some econometric issues that a¤ect all regressions and all dependent variables. In our analysis, the import price is the average monthly unit value of all extra-EU imports of Germany within the 2-digit sectors 61 and 62 that report quantities and volumes. Relative to the global apparel economy, the German market is small and import prices are thus considered as given. Therefore, endogeneity of the import unit value is of lesser concern for our study. 16 The error terms of the regressions might be serially correlated. Hence, we report results for the Prais-Winsten estimator and include a lagged dependent variable in another speci…cation. We tested all variables for the existence of unit-roots. The import unit value is integrated of order one (I(1)). We also performed Fisher's panel unit-root test for the average price of retailer r and for the average price of household type h at retailer r, respectively. The null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary is rejected. 17 Therefore, all variables are in …rst di¤erences to remove the non-stationarity of the import price. Generally, all variables are separately seasonally adjusted using monthly dummies. Also, the error terms might be correlated within a retailer, but not across retailers; so we cluster the data by retailer to correct for the potential problem of contemporaneous correlation (see Moulton, 1990) . Table 3 summarizes the regression results for equation (2) . Except for column 1, all regressions include the interaction term. The regressions di¤er with respect to the estimator (3, 4, and 8) and whether we add a lagged value of the dependent variable (5).
In (6) we use the original data and seasonally adjust it by inserting monthly dummy variables in the regression and (7) uses levels of all variables. In the basic regression, we con…rm the incomplete pass-through of import price changes into retail prices of about 24%. Distinguishing between retailers, the estimation results point to zero passthrough for H-type retailers. By contrast, the average price of L-type retailers changes by about 0:53 percent given a 1 percent change in the import price. Accordingly, there is a signi…cant di¤erence in pass-through rates across retailers. For all but one regression, L-type retailer prices are a¤ected signi…cantly more by a change in the import unit value.
The recent decline in import prices that we showed in Figure 3 is passed through to a greater extent for L-type retailers. 18 As a robustness check we repeat the estimation with heterogeneous import prices across retailers. For all speci…cations the pass-through for L-type retailers remains positive and signi…cant. Coe¢cients for H-type retailers are now positive and signi…cant for four out of eight speci…cations, but the pass-through rates are lower than those of their L-type counterpart. The results and a more detailed description (including potential data problems with this approach) can be found in Appendix A.4.
The di¤erences in price levels between H-type and L-type retailers point towards product di¤erentiation in the apparel market. Accordingly, retailers may face di¤erent price elasticities of demand depending on their customers. We utilize this potential mechanism for di¤erent pass-through rates in our theoretical explanation, where we model product di¤erentiation by retailers bundling an ex-ante homogeneous good with a service.
Retailers might di¤er with respect to which country they import apparel from. In order to consider this possibility, we regress the average price of retailer r on intra-EU import prices. If H-type retailers provide higher quality products, which in turn are more likely to be manufactured within the European Union, we would expect a positive correlation with the intra-EU import price. However, this is not the case. The estimation results for these regressions always show a higher pass-through rate for L-type retailers. 19 In addition, the coe¢cients are generally not statistically signi…cant from zero, which again points to the importance of extra-EU imports in the apparel retailing sector. We then run the same regression only with the price for Chinese imports as explanatory variable. To assume that imports from one country are homogeneous seems to be a less 
Consumers
In this section, we focus on low-and high-income households and examine whether they are a¤ected di¤erently by changes in the import unit value. First, we calculate average monthly prices paid by low-and high-income households at each retailer r in our sample.
We then regress these average prices on changes in the import price.
In line with the estimation equation in section (3.1), p h;r t is the average price of purchases of household type h (h =
We add an interaction term of the import price and the dummy variable low, which equals 1 for households with low income. That is, the total average impact of a change in the import unit value on a low-income household equals P 2 j=0 j + j . If changes in the import price p i t lead to unequal e¤ects on the household price p h;r t , we would expect j to be statistically di¤erent from zero. More speci…cally, j > 0 implies that households with a lower per-capita income are a¤ected to a greater extent by changes in the import price. Table 4 summarizes our results for di¤erent speci…cations. About 58% of a change in the import price is passed through into average prices of a low-income household. These results are statistically signi…cant for all speci…cations. 20 By contrast, in all speci…cations high-income households are a¤ected less and the coe¢cients are never signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Summarizing the results from Table 3 and 4, we observe that pass-through rates of import price changes across households can be explained by two factors. First, the purchasing behavior di¤ers by household type: High-and low-income households do not shop at the same stores with the same intensity. Total spending and the relative impor-2 0 To rule out the possibility that the results are simply driven by di¤erences in the consumption pattern, where low-income households (with more children) spend a higher share of apparel purchases on children's apparel, we delete all categories of children's apparel ("baby apparel" and "kids apparel") from the data and repeat the estimation with the remaining categories as a robustness check. The results are almost unchanged and are available upon request. Table 4 : Pass-through into average prices of high-and low-income households 14 tance of retailers measured by a household's expenditure share di¤er across households.
Second, retailers di¤er in their price levels. They also di¤er in their pass-through rates, which in turn implies di¤erent pass-through rates for low-and high-income households.
Therefore, it is crucial to consider the role of retailers to correctly analyze trade e¤ects on retail prices when households are heterogeneous with respect to income and di¤er in consumption patterns.
Endogenous Product Di¤erentiation and Pass-Through of Import Prices
In the following section, we provide a theoretical explanation for our observation that pass-through rates di¤er across retailers and consumers. In our model, …rms sell ex-ante identical imported products, but have the possibility to sell an additional local service together with a good. We interpret service in a broad sense. Services may include store service (e.g. returns, exchanges or after-sale service) and sales service (e.g. helpful and knowledgeable shop assistants and prompt attention) (Bishop Gagliano and Hathcote, 1994). Also retail store factors such as design and ambience (see for instance Grewal and Baker, 1994), a better brand image or a more central location with better accessibility may be interpreted as a service. For …rms, bundling the product with a service creates ex-post product di¤erentiation. We show that …rms always choose to di¤erentiate, i.e.
one …rm o¤ers a service and the other not, in Appendix A.7. This form of ex-post product di¤erentiation results in di¤erent price elasticities of demand for both …rms, di¤erent markups, and thus also creates an asymmetry in the elasticity of retail prices with respect to the import price. The cost for providing the service further enhances this e¤ect. Given a change in the import price, relative changes in the retail price are lower for the …rm o¤ering the bundle of good and service. The addition of the service thus dampens the pass-through of import price changes, regardless of its direction. As a consequence, if households di¤er in their willingness to pay for such services, they are not a¤ected identically by trade shocks. 21 To show this, we apply a simple model, following Shaked and Sutton (1982) , in which 2 1 Furthermore, especially in the clothing sector, brands and the importance of a brand's image also determine prices. We do not have information on brands. However, we think that this is not a major concern and we assume that service and brand image can be used interchangeably. The basic part of a T-shirt sold by a well-known brand is the imported good. Commercials and other marketing activities that establish the brand image are not produced abroad. Instead, they are supplied locally. That is, this works in the same way as our de…nition of services. Retailers who o¤er this T-shirt thus sell a bundle of the basic shirt and some additional local service. As a consequence, prices of this retailer will be higher compared to retailers selling a "no-name" brand.
two retailers sell a homogeneous imported good, but may bundle the good with a service to di¤erentiate products.
The Model
Consider a market with two retailers, each distributing an ex-ante identical good with a constant import price p i . Both …rms have the possibility to o¤er the product with a service. We show in Appendix A.7 that …rms always choose to di¤erentiate their products, i.e. one …rm o¤ers a service and the other not. Let us denote the bundle of the good and the additional service and the …rm o¤ering it as b and let us denote the good without the service and the …rm selling it as u.
Consumers obtain a higher utility from the bundle of good and service, which is captured by a premium > 1 in consumer valuation. As explained above, store service, sales service or a more central location may be examples for such a service. Consumers di¤er with respect to their gross valuation , which is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the most preferred good.
The utility derived from no purchase is zero, while a consumer who buys one unit of the good obtains a net utility of
where > 1 re ‡ects the additional utility obtained from the service, p r b is the …nal price of the bundled good and p r u is the price of the unbundled good. For = 1, the bundled and unbundled good would be considered perfect substitutes. The higher the gross valuation , the higher is the willingness to pay for the service. The consumer heterogeneity can be interpreted as di¤erences in willingness to pay for an additional local service or di¤erences in income. 22 The marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between purchasing the bundled and unbundled good has the gross valuation = 
The marginal cost of distributing the good is c for both …rms, which is normalized to zero. In addition, …rm b incurs marginal cost w for o¤ering the service, e.g. salary for
shop assistants or higher rents for more central stores. We analyze the following twostage game: In the …rst stage, …rms choose whether to bundle the good with the service or to sell only the good, see Appendix A.7. In the second stage, …rms compete in prices.
Firms' pro…ts are given as
Equilibrium prices are
Prices are strategic complements. Thus, although only …rm b o¤ers the service, also the price of …rm u, p r u , increases in service costs w. Equilibrium quantities are
and pro…ts are 23 That is, if the cost for providing the service is su¢ciently low, the pro…t is higher for the …rm bundling the good with the service. 2 3 See Appendix A.8 for absolute and relative markups.
Pass-Through of Import Price Changes
Now consider the e¤ect of a decrease in the import price. The elasticity of retail prices with respect to the import price is positive for both …rms:
Consequently, a decrease of the import price results in retail price decreases for both …rms. The elasticity of retail prices with respect to the import price is smaller than one. In absolute terms, the import price-elasticity is higher for the unbundled good as p b ;p i < pu;p i . In other words, the pass-through of import price changes to retail prices is higher for …rm u, which is driven by the higher import price share for the unbundled good p i =p r b < p i =p r u . Ex-post product di¤erentiation from bundling the good with the service results in di¤erent exposure to competition for both …rms: The price elasticity of demand is lower for …rm b, and both absolute and relative markups are higher for …rm b as compared to …rm u (see Appendix A.8). Even if the additional service was o¤ered at no cost (w = 0), the import price-elasticity would be higher for the unbundled good. However, the cost of providing the service enhances the di¤erence in import priceelasticities: The cost of providing the service lowers import price-elasticities of both …rms, but the e¤ect on the import price-elasticity of …rm b is higher than for …rm u.
The price decreases relatively more for …rm u:
. This implies that households with a low who buy the unbundled good bene…t over-proportionally from an import price decrease. 24 These implications of the model are consistent with the data: Consumers choose either a high price retailer or a low price retailer depending on their willingness to pay, which is determined by income. In our model, the retailers who bundle their good with a service are the high price retailers. We …nd that the aggregate pass-through of import price changes to retail prices is incomplete. High-price retailers do not pass through changes in the import price. By contrast, L-retailers pass through import price changes at a rate of 53% within three months. This results in a decrease of the relative price, as Figure 3 shows. We also observe that the estimated pass-through rates for low-income households are 58% and thus signi…cantly larger than those for high-income households.
While our model is consistent with the empirical observations, there are alternative 2 4 See Appendix A.9 for a detailed discussion of welfare e¤ects.
explanations for why pass-through rates might di¤er across high price retailers and low price retailers. For instance, high price retailer might import di¤erent products (e.g. of better quality) than low price retailers. Di¤erent price elasticities for di¤erent goods, e.g.
because of di¤erent intensities in competition, may then explain di¤erent pass-through rates across high-and low-price retailers. Another potential source of heterogeneity in pass-through rates across retailers may be the sourcing from di¤erent countries, when import prices change di¤erently across countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study pass-through rates of import price changes across retailers and households. We estimate that high price-retailers do not pass through changes in the import price. By contrast, low-price retailers show a pass-through rate of 53% within three months. The pass-through into retail prices depends on the shopping behavior of households: Import price changes are passed through to low-income households at a rate of 58%. High-income households have a pass-through rate that is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
We then provide a possible explanation for these observations with the help of a simple model with a heterogeneous demand side and endogenous vertical product di¤er-entiation stemming from the possibility to bundle a homogeneous imported good with services. This generates heterogeneous pass-through rates across retailers and households following a change in the import price. Retailers who bundle a good with a service pass through import price changes to a lesser extent. Consequently, the purchase of a service by high-income households isolates them from price changes.
This paper sheds light on the link between trade and real income inequality. Whereas traditional trade models explain how real income changes due to changes in real factor prices, assuming that households have homothetic preferences and consume the same bundle of goods, we show a di¤erent channel that has not received much attention in the literature. We can show that households with di¤erent income buy from di¤erent retailers with di¤erent pass-through rates and experience di¤erent real income e¤ects.
Our results suggest that heterogeneous pass-through rates constitute a link between trade and inequality. Trade liberalization and the corresponding decrease in import prices, for instance during the ATC phase-out, may reduce within-country inequality.
As import price decreases are passed-through to low-income households to a greater extent, low-income households will experience a gain in real income. By contrast, trade barriers and rising import prices tend to harm low-income households relatively more.
That is, through the channel of heterogeneous pass-through rates, trade barriers may increase within-country inequality.
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Appendix
A.1 Share of Items purchased at a Retailer Table 5 : Share of items bought at a speci…c retailer, selection of full sample
A.2 Unit-Root Tests
We tested for unit-roots with the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller test (ADF-test). The number of included lags has been chosen according to the Akaike information criterion provided by Stata. The results for the import price are given in Table 6 . The import price is tested to be integrated of order one. Average prices for each retailer r (p r t ) and average prices of household type h at retailer r p h;r t are tested with Fisher's unit-root test for unbalanced panels using both, the ADF and the Phillips-Perron test. As Table 7 indicates, the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary is clearly rejected. Cr , where the import unit value imp of retailer r at time t is the sum of the import unit value of GfK category j weighted by the number of retailer sales c in category j over the total number of retailer sales C. The estimation is identical to (2) except that the import unit values are now retailer speci…c. The results are presented in Table 9 . The coe¢cients for L-type retailers remain positive and signi…cant. Coe¢cients for H-type retailers are now positive and signi…cant in four speci…cations, but pass-through rates of H-type retailers are lower than for their L-type counterpart.
For various data reasons the results have to be regarded with some caution. First, the trade data provided by Eurostat (classi…ed in CN) and the household consumption data provided by the GfK use di¤erent apparel classi…cations. There is no correspondence table that maps both categories such that mapping has to take place "by hand", where a CN category is mapped into a GfK category according to its name. The de…nitions and descriptions of the categories are, however, rather di¤erent for some categories such that mapping is somewhat arbitrary. Second, this approach would lead to a decrease of observations. After cleaning the data for missing links between trade and consumption data, our sample is reduced to 733,600 observations. Given that we have 80 retailers in 96 time periods, we end up with an average of slightly less than 100 observations per retailer and time period. This, third, would make the import unit value for a retailer very prone to changes in consumption patterns. If incidentally consumers at a given retailer buy for instance mainly overcoats in one month and mainly swimwear in another month from the same retailer, we would see a huge change in the import unit value simply because of consumption changes and not because the import price changed. A.5 Robustness Check: Intra-EU Import Prices Table 11 presents the results for intra-EU import prices. Although the e¤ects are statistically signi…cant only for the regression in levels the qualitative results that L-type retailers have a higher pass-through rate compared to H-type retailers holds for all speci…cations. In order to calculate the adjusted per-capita income we used the OECDmodi…ed equivalence scale. According to the website of the OECD85, these scales assign a value of 1 for the …rst person of a household. Each additional adult is given a value of 0.5, and each child 0.3. Here, we also apply two other scales. First, the "OECD equivalence scale" that gives a value of 0.7 for each additional adult and 0.5 for each child.
Second, we use the "Square root scale" that is simply the square root of the household's size. As Table 10 shows, our results do not seem to be sensitive to the chosen equivalence scale. Using the "OECD equivalence scale" or the "Square root scale" slightly increases the pass-through rates to about 60 -67%. Nevertheless, over all speci…cations the passthrough rates for low-income households are signi…cantly higher than for high-income households. ... Table 13 : Firm pro…ts in a simultaneous game Nash equilibria are (no service, service) and (service, no service). That is, in equilibrium, …rms will di¤erentiate, one …rm will bundle the good with a service, the other one will o¤er only the good. In other words, the point that exactly one …rm is o¤ering a service is not an exogenous assumption, but an endogenous result of the model. If …rms decide sequentially, the …rst mover will choose to provide a service along with the good, if w < ( p 1)(p i + p ). The second mover then will choose to o¤er only the good.
A.8 Absolute and Relative Markups
Absolute markups for both …rms are:
with b > u , if w < Following a decrease of the import price, absolute markups increase for both …rms:
The absolute markup increases by more for …rm 2: 
The change of relative markup is higher for …rm 2, if the import price is su¢ciently low: 
A.9 Welfare Analysis
This subsection investigates the welfare implications of a decrease of the import price.
Decreasing prices increase the total quantity sold:
Firm u gains more than …rm b of this additional market size, i.e. quantity sold, as @q b @p i < @qu @p i . The …rm o¤ering the good without a service is more exposed to changes in the import price. A decrease of the import price induces a higher price decrease and a higher quantity increase.
For both …rms, a decreasing import price increases pro…ts: 
The pro…t for …rm b increases by more if w < p i ( 1). Whether import price decreases induce higher pro…t changes for …rm b or …rm u, depends on the cost of providing the service. If the service cost is relatively small, …rm b gains more from import price decreases in terms of pro…t. If the service cost is relatively high, …rm u increases its pro…t by more.
For consumers, a decrease of the import price is associated with lower prices for both the bundle of good and service and the unbundled good. In addition, both quantities sold increase, implying that some consumers change from the unbundled to the bundled good and some consumers with a low gross valuation who did not buy before now purchase the unbundled good.
Denoting variables after the change in the import price by a tilde (~), the increase in consumers surplus is given by:
which can be decomposed into four e¤ects: 
If the import price is su¢ciently high, the increase of consumer surplus is higher for consumers who bought the bundle before. That is, the e¤ect from the price decrease of b exceeds the e¤ect from a higher gross utility and a price decrease of u for the consumers who bought the unbundled good before. As a consequence, although the pass-through rate is higher for u, consumers buying b can gain more from import price decreases in terms of consumer surplus. Vice versa, if the import price is su¢ciently low, the increase of consumer surplus for consumers who bought the unbundled good before outweighs the increase of consumer surplus for consumers who bought the bundle before.
In addition to price changes, two other e¤ects induce welfare changes: First, some consumers switch from the unbundled good to the bundle in case of price decreases (and vice versa for price increases). These consumers experience additional utility from the consumption of the service (or less utility from waiving the service.) Second, some consumers who could not buy the good before can a¤ord the good in case of price decreases (or can no longer a¤ord the good in case of price increases).
